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Risking Criminal Liability in Cultural Property
Transactions
Karin Orenstein†
“It’s my nature,” [Michael Steinhardt] said. “As an investor, I
welcomed the qualities of risk in all sorts of investments, and I
didn’t necessarily shy away from risk.”1
After the Dubai trip in 2010, Mr. Carroll said he twice told [Steve]
Green to end the purchase negotiations because of “issues of
provenance” with the cuneiform tablets. He said Mr. Green told
him, “My family is not averse to risk.” Mr. Green did not dispute
Mr. Carroll’s account.2
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1 Christian Berthelsen & Katya Kazakina, Hex of the Idol: Steinhardt, Christie’s
Fight
Heritage
Claim,
BLOOMBERG
(Aug.
18,
2017,
5:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-18/hex-of-the-idol-steinhardtchristie-s-fight-heritage-claim [https://perma.cc/9KR9-DE5K].
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I. Introduction
One of the concerns attending a cultural property transaction is
the risk that the subject of the transaction is stolen property.3
Whether a piece was looted from a site where it had rested since
antiquity or was stolen from a more recent owner, trafficking in
stolen property has serious potential consequences ranging from
loss of value to criminal liability.
3 One particularly well-explored manner in which art and artifacts have come to be
stolen is as a result of Nazi looting during the Second World War. For a general overview
of Nazi plunder and individual attempts to recover looted artwork, see generally Donald
S. Burris, Restoration of a Culture: A California Lawyer’s Lengthy Quest to Restitute NaziLooted Art, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 277 (2020) (providing an overview of Nazi looting and a
chronology of American legal cases pertaining thereto); see also generally Marc
Masurovsky, A Comparative Look at Nazi Plundered Art, Looted Antiquities, & Stolen
Indigenous Objects, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 497 (2020) (discussing looted indigenous art and
Nazi plunder, as well as the sociological implications thereof); Simon J. Frankel, The
HEAR Act & Laches After Three Years, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 441 (2020) (discussing
conflicting court decisions relating to Holocaust-era looted art, the 2016 HEAR Act, and
the equitable doctrine of latches).
Another way in which cultural property comes to be stolen is from pillaging
archaeologically-rich nations. For a discussion of the legal issues such pillaging raises,
see generally Patty Gerstenblith, Provenience & Provenance Intersecting with
International Law in the Market for Antiquities, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 457 (2020) (discussing
the application of international laws and U.S. domestic laws on looted art to the context of
plundered archaeological artifacts). For a discussion of the political calculus involved in
the repatriation of such artifacts, see generally Leila Amineddoleh, The Politicizing of
Cultural Heritage, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 333 (2020) (discussing the repatriation of cultural
heritage and the political calculations involved). Finally, for an overview of how the
American civil asset forfeiture system can assist in such repatriations, see generally Stefan
Cassella, Recovering Stolen Art & Antiquities Under the Forfeiture Laws: Who Is Entitled
to the Property When There Are Conflicting Claims, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 393 (2020)
(providing an overview of civil asset forfeiture laws and how they work to assist in the
recovery of looted cultural patrimony).
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Buyers and sellers seeking to avoid dealing in stolen property
look to a piece’s “provenance,” its history of ownership over time.4
Provenance records can be used to demonstrate the legality of one’s
ownership and possession of a cultural object.5 However, given the
lack of standardization or regulation of provenance in the art
market, provenance records can also be easily falsified, making
purchases of cultural property risky.6 Some dishonest dealers
simply add a false provenance sentence to their invoices, while
others create forgeries with painstaking attention to detail.7
Consider the efforts undertaken by Jonathan Tokeley Parry to cover
up the fact that he and his co-conspirator, Frederick Schultz, were
selling Egyptian antiquities that had been recently exported from
Egypt.8 First, Parry invented an old English collection named after
his deceased great-uncle Thomas Alcock.9 Then, he used tea bags
to artificially age labels for objects included in the fake collection.10
Parry even used 1920s restoration techniques, followed by a “phony
restoration report describing what he purportedly did, as a modern
restorer, to remove the old restoration.”11
This Comment shifts the focus from the sellers to the buyers.
4 See
Provenance
Guide,
INT’L
FOUND.
FOR
ART
RES.,
https://www.ifar.org/Provenance_Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/WC4U-47SY].
5 See id. at 2.
6 Id.
7 For example, in United States v. Khouli, the lead defendant allegedly laundered
cultural property he acquired from others by listing his father’s 1960s collection in the
provenance. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants Alshdaifat’s and Lewis’s
Omnibus Motions at 5–8, United States v. Khouli, No. 11-CR-340 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
Similarly, in United States v. One Iraqi Assyrian Head, the government alleged that when
the shipper sent Iraqi and Egyptian cultural property to the United States, he listed Turkey
as the country of origin, relying on unrelated Turkish import papers in his possession that
he could produce to customs officials upon request. Complaint at 5, United States v. One
Iraqi Assyrian Head, No. 13-CV-5015 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Finally, in United States v. One
Triangular Fresco Fragment, the shipper supplied a provenance to U.S. Customs & Border
Protection that stated that the fresco was Macedonian in origin and was located in a private
Swiss residence from 1959 through 2011. However, further investigation revealed that the
fresco was Italian in origin and came from a site that was not discovered until 1969, 10
years after the false provenance placed the piece in Switzerland. Complaint at 7–10,
United States v. One Triangular Fresco Fragment, No. 13-CV-6286 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
8 See United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Brief by
Appellee, United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003) (No. 02-1357).
9 Brief by Appellee, supra note 8, at 3.
10 Id. at 6.
11 Id. at 6–7 (citing trial transcript and exhibit).
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When does a buyer of cultural property cross the line from taking a
business risk to knowingly engaging in criminal conduct involving
stolen property? Is taking a calculated risk by buying a piece with
suspect provenance an act of business acumen, or—when it turns
out to be stolen—knowing criminal conduct? To address these
questions, this Comment will discuss legal and practical
considerations surrounding these transactions and then apply the
law to several hypothetical sales of cultural property. Part II
examines areas where the law is more clearly established; it will
identify U.S. laws available to combat illicit trafficking in stolen
property, focusing on the National Stolen Property Act (“NSPA”),
and discuss the doctrine of conscious avoidance. Part III explores
areas where the law is not well fleshed out, including provenance
and red flags in cultural property transactions. Finally, Part IV
applies the NSPA and the conscious avoidance doctrine to potential
red flags in hypothetical cultural property transactions.
II. Legal Background
A. U.S. Laws Used to Combat Cultural Property Trafficking
The United States is considered one of the top market countries
for cultural property.12 At the federal level, both criminal and civil
laws restrict the movement of stolen cultural property. The laws
and regulations that are commonly called upon to restrict or
criminalize the movement of cultural property include the
following: the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act
(“CPIA”), a series of civil statutes that implement the 1970
UNESCO Convention;13 import restrictions on cultural property
based on bilateral agreements or emergency actions promulgated

12 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-673, REPORT TO
CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS: CULTURAL PROPERTY: PROTECTION OF IRAQI AND SYRIAN
ANTIQUITIES
11 (Aug. 2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/679075.pdf
[https://perma.cc/88XC-PVR2] (the United States is the largest “legal antiquities market”
according to “agency officials and art market experts” consulted by the GAO); see also
Lydia Deloumeaux, UNESCO Inst. for Statistics, The Globalization of Cultural Trade: A
Shift in Consumption: International Flows of Cultural Goods and Services 2004–2013, at
34, 139, UNESCO Doc. UIS/2016/CUL/TD/1 (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.15220/978-929189-185-6-en [https://perma.cc/QB66-YLLD] (showing the United States consistently
ranked as the number one importer of cultural goods of cultural and natural heritage from
2004 through 2013).
13 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2613 (2012).
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pursuant to the CPIA;14 criminal laws prohibiting smuggling and
false statements ;15 customs regulations contained in the Code of
Federal Regulations, such as those requiring truthful declarations to
U.S. Customs & Border Protection (“CBP” or “Customs”) and
formal entry of goods valued at more than $2,500;16 and the
NSPA.17 The United States also protects cultural property
originating within its borders through the Archaeological Resources
Protection Act (“ARPA”)18 and the Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”).19 In addition to
these laws, there are multiple laws granting the United States
authority to forfeit smuggled or stolen cultural property.20
When cultural property originating in a foreign country is found
in the United States under suspicious circumstances, U.S. law
enforcement will look to the laws of the country of origin.21 If a
foreign country maintains and enforces a patrimony law—a law that
vests ownership of cultural property in the state—removal of
cultural property from that country without authorization is the legal

19 C.F.R. §§ 12.104g, 12.104j, 12.104k (2019). See generally Current Import
Restrictions, BUREAU OF EDUC. & CULTURAL AFF., https://eca.state.gov/cultural-heritagecenter/cultural-property-advisory-committee/current-import-restrictions
[https://perma.cc/B327-9UTC] (detailing a list of current U.S. international import
restriction agreements on cultural property with various countries).
15 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 541–555 (2012).
16 19 C.F.R. § 145.12(a) (2019).
See generally 19 C.F.R. §§ 141–145 (2019)
(providing regulations on the entry of merchandise, the entry process, special entry
procedures, warehouse and rewarehouse entries and withdrawals, and mail importations).
17 National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–2315 (2012). Other more
commonly charged federal criminal laws may also be implicated by the facts of a given
case, including mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341), wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343), false
statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001), money laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1956), tax crimes (26
U.S.C. § 7201–7230), and conspiracy to violate the NSPA, customs laws, or any of the
foregoing crimes (18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1349, 1956(h)).
18 Archaeological Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa–470mm (2012).
19 Native American Graves Protection Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3012 (2012).
20 For example, 18 U.S.C. § 545 (2012) (criminal forfeiture of smuggled items); 19
U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(1)(A) (2012) (civil forfeiture of merchandise that has been “stolen,
smuggled or clandestinely imported or introduced”); and 19 U.S.C. § 2609 (2012) (civil
forfeiture of cultural property imported in violation of the CPIA).
21 United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1999)
(discussing Customs Directive No. 5230-15 which “advised customs officials to determine
whether property was subject to a claim of foreign ownership” prior to seizing the
property).
14
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equivalent of stealing.22 However, if the property was merely
removed in violation of a foreign export law, it will not be
considered “actionable” under U.S. law “for that reason alone.”23
Therefore, a valid provenance showing that cultural property was
removed from a country at a time when it had no patrimony law in
force provides a defense to a claim by the country for the property’s
return, forfeiture allegations based on importation of stolen
property, or criminal charges based on dealing in stolen property.24
B. The Knowledge Element of the NSPA
The main criminal law that should concern art market
participants, setting aside laws which criminalize conduct during
importation, is the NSPA. The NSPA, codified at Sections 2314
and 2315 of Title 18 of the United States Code, criminalizes a broad
swath of commercial activities.25 Section 2314 criminalizes the
movement of stolen property across a state or national border, while
Section 2315 criminalizes its subsequent receipt, possession,
concealment, storage, bartering, sale or disposition of stolen
property.26 Both statutes include, as an element of the crime, that
the stolen property crossed interstate or international boundaries, an
inevitability with foreign cultural property in the United States.27
This Comment considers how the mens rea element of the
NSPA—knowledge—might be satisfied through a purchasing
dealer or collector’s conscious avoidance. The starting point of this
inquiry is the language of the NSPA itself. The NSPA language
applicable to cultural property is as follows:
Title 18, United States Code, Section 2314
Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or foreign
commerce any goods, wares, merchandise . . . of the value of
22 See United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 410 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the
NSPA applies to property stolen in violation of a foreign patrimony law whose language
and enforcement shows that it was intended to assert true ownership over the property);
see also United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 1000–01 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding “that
a declaration of national ownership is necessary before illegal exportation of an article can
be considered theft, and the exported article considered ‘stolen,’ within the meaning of the
[NSPA]”).
23 McClain, 545 F.2d at 996.
24 See Schultz, 333 F.3d at 393.
25 National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–2315 (2012).
26 Id.
27 Id.
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$5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted
or taken by fraud . . . . Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both . . . .28
Title 18, United States Code, Section 2315
Whoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or
disposes of any goods, wares, or merchandise . . . of the value of
$5,000 or more . . . which have crossed a State or United States
boundary after being stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken,
knowing the same to have been stolen, unlawfully converted, or
taken . . . . Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than ten years, or both . . . .29

The knowledge element of the NSPA relates to the actor’s
knowledge that the goods were stolen or unlawfully or fraudulently
taken.30 More specifically, Section 2314 provides that the
perpetrator must know that the property has been “stolen, converted
or taken by fraud.”31 Section 2315 contains similar but slightly
different language: “stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken.”32
Courts interpreting the NSPA have found that despite these
differences, both sections apply to “all felonious takings” that
deprive an owner of her property “regardless of whether or not the
theft constitutes common-law larceny.”33 Knowledge can be
proven not only by evidence of actual awareness of certain facts,
but through evidence that the defendant consciously avoided
learning those facts.34 The conscious avoidance theory will be
discussed in more detail below.
In the context of cultural property, direct knowledge that

Id. § 2314.
Id. § 2315.
30 United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 411 (2d Cir. 2003).
31 National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2012).
32 Id. § 2315.
33 See United States v. McClintic, 570 F.2d 685, 688 (8th Cir. 1978); see also United
States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (defining conversion
in Section 2314 as “the unauthorized and wrongful exercise of dominion and control over
another’s personal property, to exclusion of or inconsistent with the rights of the owner”).
34 See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 701 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that
deliberate ignorance or conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth is enough to prove
an element of knowledge); United States v. Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250, 255 (3d Cir. 2000)
(“[I]t is not inconsistent for a court to give a charge on both willful blindness and actual
knowledge, for if the jury does not find the existence of actual knowledge, it might still
find willful blindness.”).
28
29
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previously documented works were stolen may be available through
stolen art databases, news reports, or other sources. Knowledge that
undocumented property was stolen may be difficult to come by;
market participants often look to circumstantial evidence to assess
the legal status of a piece and the validity of a proffered provenance.
For example, country-specific “red lists” of cultural objects at risk
issued by the International Council of Museums (“ICOM”) can raise
awareness that a class of artifacts is likely to include stolen pieces.35
C. The Conscious Avoidance Doctrine
Conscious avoidance is often used interchangeably with “willful
blindness” or “deliberate ignorance.”36 At its base, the doctrine
stands for the proposition that “a defendant’s affirmative efforts to
‘see no evil’ and ‘hear no evil’ do not somehow magically invest
him with the ability to ‘do no evil.’”37
As courts discussing conscious avoidance have not adopted a
single articulation of the doctrine, for purposes of discussing its
application to stolen cultural property, this Comment adopts the
following model federal jury instruction:
In determining whether the defendant acted knowingly, you
may consider whether the defendant deliberately closed his eyes
to what would otherwise have been obvious to him. If you find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with (or that
the defendant’s ignorance was solely and entirely the result of) a
conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth (e.g., that the
statement was false), then this element may be satisfied.
However, guilty knowledge may not be established by
demonstrating that the defendant was merely negligent, foolish,
or mistaken.

35 Red
Lists
Database,
INT’L
COUNCIL
OF
MUSEUMS,
https://icom.museum/en/resources/red-lists/ [https://perma.cc/FH9T-RMPR] (providing
drop-down filters for searching for red listed items and hosts copies of PDFs for various
particular red lists, such as “Emergency Red List of Cultural Objects at Risk – Yemen”).
36 KEVIN F. O’MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG, & HON. WILLIAM C. LEE, FEDERAL JURY
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, § 17:09 “Deliberate ignorance—Explained” (6th ed. 2019)
(“This type of ‘deliberate ignorance’ or ‘conscious avoidance’ instruction, sometimes also
called a ‘Jewell’ or ‘ostrich’ instruction should only be given ‘when the defendant claims
a lack of guilty knowledge and there are facts and evidence that support an inference of
deliberate ignorance.’”) (quoting United States v. McAllister, 747 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829, 106 S.Ct. 92, 88 L.Ed.2d 76 (1985)).
37 United States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 218 n.26 (2d Cir. 1987).
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If you find that the defendant was aware of a high probability
that (e.g., the statement was false) and that the defendant acted
with deliberate disregard of the facts, you may find that the
defendant acted knowingly. However, if you find that the
defendant actually believed that (e.g., the statement was true), he
may not be convicted.38

To summarize, conscious avoidance may be found where a
defendant (1) was aware of a high probability that the fact was true,
and (2) acted with a conscious purpose of avoiding learning the
truth.39 Further, a defendant will not be found to have consciously
avoided knowledge if a factfinder concludes that he actually
believed that the fact was not true or that the defendant was merely
negligent, foolish, or mistaken.40
In a criminal case charging a violation of the NSPA, the
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an object
was stolen.41 The defendant’s knowledge that the object was stolen
would be the subject of a conscious avoidance instruction.42 A
factfinder may decide that a defendant meets the knowledge
standard if the government proves that the defendant was aware of
the high probability that the property was stolen and deliberately
disregarded available information or avoided learning facts that
would have made the property’s legal status obvious.43 The
defendant may counter evidence of conscious avoidance by arguing
that either the defendant actually believed that the property was not
stolen or “was merely negligent, foolish or mistaken.”44 The
sophistication, experience and past practices of the defendant in the
cultural property market, and whether the defendant sought and
received advice, will be relevant to a factfinder’s consideration of
38 MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL, ¶ 3A.01, Scienter, Instruction
3A-2 Conscious Avoidance: Deliberately Closing Eyes (Matthew Bender 2019) (citing
Supreme Court and Circuit Court authorities) [hereinafter Scienter Instructions].
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2012).
42 See United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 413–14 (2d Cir. 2003).
43 Whether or not the defendant’s inquiry would have resulted in actual knowledge
is not the relevant inquiry. United States v. Nektalov, 461 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2006)
(“[T]he applicability of the doctrine does not turn on the truth of the particular proposition
in question, but on what the defendant does to avoid reaching subjective certainty
(mistaken or not) about that proposition.”).
44 See Scienter Instructions, supra note 38.
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this defense.45
To warrant the conscious avoidance instruction at trial, “(a) the
element of knowledge must be in dispute and (b) the evidence
would permit a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the fact in
dispute and consciously avoided confirming that fact.”46 The
instruction may not be given if the “evidence alerting a defendant to
the high probability of criminal activity”—here, theft—is “direct
evidence of the illegality itself,” as this would result in a defendant’s
actual knowledge of the theft.47 If, on the other hand, the evidence
of theft is circumstantial, the instruction can be given in the
alternative as circumstantial evidence which “can be used to show
both actual knowledge and conscious avoidance.”48
III. Practical Considerations in Cultural Property
Transactions: Provenance and Red Flags
A. Evolving Expectations Regarding Provenance
Provenances are not standardized in law or practice and are
therefore inconsistent in appearance, contents, and level of detail.49
A typical provenance takes the form of a typed entry on a seller’s
invoice or letterhead.50 It may or may not be supported by
45 See United States v. Lumiere, 249 F. Supp. 3d 748, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (stating
that the knowledge element is subjective, not objective); cf. Schultz, 333 F.3d at 416
(taking into account Schultz’s expertise “in the field of Egyptian antiquities [and] many
years of experience” in determining whether he had actual knowledge of Egypt’s
patrimony law).
46 Lumiere, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), appeal withdrawn, No. 17-2010,
2017 WL 9732075 (2d Cir. Oct. 11, 2017).
47 Nektalov, 461 F.3d at 316 (noting that “a conscious avoidance instruction is ‘not
appropriate’” in such circumstances) (quoting United States v. Sanchez–Robles, 927 F.2d
1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 1991)).
48 United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260, 278 (2d Cir. 2011). See United States v.
Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250, 255 (3d Cir. 2000).
49 Jane A. Levine, The Importance of Provenance Documentation in the Market for
Ancient Art and Artifacts: The Future of the Market May Depend on Documenting the
Past, 19 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 219, 229 (2009) (noting the lack of
“accepted consensus surrounding the type of documentation and the nature of the evidence
that buyers and sellers will accept as proof of ownership history”).
50 Id. at 229; see, e.g., De Sole v. Knoedler Gallery, LLC, 139 F. Supp. 3d 618, 628
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (provenance included on gallery invoices); Duchossois Indus., Inc. v.
Stelloh, No. 87 C 4132, 1988 WL 2794, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 13, 1988) (provenance written
on the seller’s stationery).
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documentary evidence such as sales receipts, publications in
museum, gallery or auction catalogs, customs declarations, and
even family photographs.51 The fact that provenances can be
generated by anyone means they can be easily faked by the
unscrupulous.52 Moreover, many provenances are difficult to verify
through due diligence, as collectors and dealers are traditionally
secretive; a typical provenance lists prior owners as “private
collectors” located in particular countries or cities.53 These
monikers could represent good-faith attempts to preserve the
privacy of sellers and restrict access to the dealers’ legitimate
sources. On the other hand, they could be fraudulently invented to
disguise an incomplete history that would dissuade a potential buyer
or, worse, to cover up a known history that is problematic. For
example, a buyer might not purchase a piece if the first recorded
owner on the provenance was a dealer who is widely believed to
have trafficked in looted artifacts.
The 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting
and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership
of Cultural Property (the “1970 UNESCO Convention”), which
addressed methods to prevent cultural property trafficking, return
looted property, and foster international cooperation, marked a
turning point in the treatment of provenance.54 After the 1970
UNESCO Convention was promulgated, many professionals in the
Levine, supra note 49, at 231.
See Provenance Guide, supra note 4. See, e.g., Catherine Hickley, Germany’s $14
Million Art Forgers Jailed for Total 15 Years, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 27, 2011, 9:07 AM)
(reporting that the criminals “even forged family photographs from the 1930s, showing
paintings hanging in the background, with [defendant] posing as her grandmother, to
convince potential buyers that the provenance was authentic”).
53 Multiple art market participants and academics have proposed registration systems
for cultural property to address issues of both authenticity and ownership going forward.
See, e.g., Jennifer Anglim Kreder & Benjamin A. Bauer, Protecting Property Rights and
Unleashing Capital in Art, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 881, 885 (2011) (proposing a Federal
Bureau of Cultural Property Registration); Derek Fincham, Assessing the Viability of
Blockchain to Impact the Antiquities Trade, 37 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 605, 622–24
(2019) (describing initiatives to integrate blockchain and the cultural property trade);
William G. Pearlstein, White Paper: A Proposal to Reform U.S. Law and Policy Relating
to the International Exchange of Cultural Property, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 561,
579 (2014) (proposing an electronic database in which insufficiently documented objects
can be published anonymously and become “free and clear of any claims” if the country
of origin does not claim the object within one year).
54 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231.
51
52
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archaeological and ancient art market voluntarily adopted standards
which recognize 1970 as an ethical line in the sand; objects for
which there is no documentation showing they were removed from
their source country before 1970 or legally exported after 1970 are
subject to higher scrutiny.55 In 1973, the Archaeological Institute
of America (“AIA”) adopted a resolution discouraging museums
from acquiring pieces collected from that point forward “in
violation of the laws obtaining in the countries of origin.”56 The
AIA and its publication, the American Journal of Archaeology
(“AJA”), also barred the use of the AIA annual meeting and AJA as
fora for initial announcements or publication of research concerning
objects that did not meet the AIA’s antiquities policy.57 In 2008,
the American Alliance of Museums (“AAM”) issued a guideline
“recommend[ing] that museums require documentation that [an]
object was out of its probable country of modern discovery by
November 17, 1970.”58 Likewise, in 2013, the Association of Art
Museum Directors (“AAMD”) issued guidelines adopting 1970 “as
a threshold for a more rigorous analysis of provenance
information.”59 Over time, many market participants and observers
began to view 1970 as a dividing line for ethical collecting, though
empirical research suggests that the “1970 standard” has not had a
clear impact on the sale of antiquities.60
While the 1970 UNESCO Convention impacted the treatment

55 See Patty Gerstenblith, The Meaning of 1970 for the Acquisition of Archaeological
Objects, 38 J. FIELD ARCHAEOLOGY 4, 364 (2013) (describing “the 1970 standard”).
56 Resolution on the Acquisition of Antiquities by Museums, ARCHAEOLOGICAL
INST. OF AM. (Dec. 19, 1973), https://www.archaeological.org/resolution-on-theacquisition-of-antiquities-by-museums/ [https://perma.cc/MJB3-ZBCW].
57 See Gerstenblith, supra note 55, at 365 (discussing the use of the 1970 UNESECO
Convention as an ethical guide by professional organizations).
58 Archaeological Material and Ancient Art, AM. ALL. OF MUSEUMS (July 2008),
https://www.aam-us.org/programs/ethics-standards-and-professionalpractices/archaeological-material-and-ancient-art/ [https://perma.cc/9TD2-SW7X].
59 Guidelines on the Acquisition of Archaeological Material and Ancient Art, AM.
ALL. OF MUSEUMS (2013) (discouraging members from acquiring an object “unless
provenance research substantiates that the Work was outside its country of probable
modern discovery before 1970 or was legally exported from its probable country of
modern discovery after 1970,” and allowing members to exercise their judgment with
respect to pieces lacking complete provenances).
60 See Lauren Baker, Controlling the Market: An Analysis of the 1970 UNESCO Rule
on Acquisition and the Market for Unprovenanced Antiquities, 52 STAN. J. INT’L L. 321,
332 (2016).
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of provenance by the art and archaeology community after 1970, the
market arguably had lower expectations about documenting
ownership in connection with pre-1970 transactions.61
Accordingly, the recorded history of prior owners and sellers, even
for legally owned property, may trail off prior to that date, leading
to the quandary of “orphaned” pieces.62 Orphaned cultural property
consists of art or artifacts with insufficient provenance to satisfy
current ethical standards.63 Between the risk that a seller of these
antiquities is not passing along good title,64 and the fact that a
significant portion of the cultural property community has
voluntarily agreed not to promote or engage in transactions
involving such property, the market value of orphans can be reduced
and their current owners may find it difficult to find new homes for
these objects.65 Nonetheless, the lack of a pre-1970 provenance
alone does not render a transaction illegal and orphaned property
continues to be purchased by those willing to assume some risk.66
B. Potential of Red Flags in Cultural Property Transactions
The following potential red flags in cultural property
transactions have been identified by courts in New York, one of the
largest and most significant art markets67:
See Levine, supra note 49, at 229–30.
62 See William G. Pealstein, White Paper: A proposal to Reform U.S. Law and Policy
Relating to the International Exchange of Cultural Property, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 561, 570 n.20 (2014) (estimating that “hundreds of thousands” or a “million or more”
objects became “orphans” following the AAMD’s adoption of the “1970 Rule”).
63 See Richard M. Leventhal & Brian I. Daniels, “Orphaned Objects,” Ethical
Standards, and the Acquisition of Antiquities, 23 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
L. 339, 347 (2013).
64 Some possessors of stolen property have argued that they acquired valid title by
operation of foreign laws. See, e.g., Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2010)
(possessor of disputed drawing argued that under Swiss law a prior purchaser acquired
valid legal title after five years passed without a prior owner claiming the property).
However, if a claim is lodged after the disputed property has been imported into the United
States, U.S. courts choose to apply local laws which typically bar a thief’s downstream
purchasers from ever acquiring good title to the stolen property. See, e.g., id. at 140–46
(holding that New York law preventing a thief from passing good title, rather than Swiss
law, governed the ownership of Nazi-looted art); In re Newpower, 233 F.3d 922, 929 (6th
Cir. 2000) (noting the “proposition, long established at common law, that a thief has no
title in the property that he steals”).
65 See Leventhal & Daniels, supra note 63, at 350.
66 See id. at 352.
67 See, e.g., Biro v. Nast, No. 11 Civ. 4442 JPO, 2012 WL 3262770, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
61

540

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLV

(1) whether the sale price is obviously below market, (2) whether
the negotiations or procedure of the sale differed from previous
transactions between buyer and seller, (3) whether the buyer was
aware of the seller’s financial difficulties, or (4) whether the
buyer would have reason to doubt the seller’s ownership of the
artwork.68

Additional red flags in the sale of art and artifacts could include
the following: fresh chisel marks; a previously unknown hoard of
cultural artifacts from a heavily looted region; the appearance at the
start of a provenance chain of a person known for possessing or
trafficking in stolen cultural property; use of a country of origin that
would be unusual for the artifact and which does not have a
longstanding patrimony law; existence of multiple, inconsistent
versions of the provenance; the appearance of the type of cultural
property on a “red list” for a country with longstanding patrimony
laws; and concerning remarks made by the seller, such as
discouraging further investigation.
IV. Applying the Conscious Avoidance Doctrine to Red Flags
in Cultural Property Transactions
There is clear precedent for applying the conscious avoidance
doctrine to the knowledge element of the NSPA in the context of
stolen cultural property. United States v. Schultz, a leading case
concerning cultural property and the NSPA, involved appellate
review of a conscious avoidance instruction.69 In Schultz, the issue
was not whether Egyptian artifacts had been recently removed from
Egypt; Schultz and Parry were well aware of the origin of their
pieces and had created false provenances.70 Instead, the fact at issue
was whether Schultz was aware of an Egyptian patrimony law that
vested ownership of these artifacts in the state.71
Another leading cultural property case involving the conscious
avoidance doctrine and the NSPA is United States v. Portrait of

Aug. 10, 2012) (referencing “the centrality of New York City to the global art market”).
68 Overton v. Art Fin. Partners LLC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 388, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(noting that these “possible red flags” have been identified by courts applying New York
law as triggering a “duty of heightened inquiry in the art industry”).
69 United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 412–14 (2d Cir. 2003).
70 Id. at 396.
71 Id. at 416 (“Schultz’s defense at trial was that he was unaware of the existence of
Law 117 [Egypt’s patrimony law].”).
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Wally, a civil forfeiture action involving Egon Schiele’s painting of
Valerie Neuzil.72 Had Portrait of Wally proceeded to trial, an issue
for the jury would have been whether one of the key figures in the
case “knew, or consciously avoided knowing” that the painting was
stolen based on his interactions with the victim.73
This Comment focuses on how a downstream purchaser who,
unlike the actors in Schultz and Portrait of Wally, lacks direct
knowledge of a piece’s history would fare under a conscious
avoidance standard. The buyer’s awareness of an earlier theft—or
conscious avoidance of that fact—would be based on information
provided by the seller, the buyer’s due diligence, and the buyer’s
interpretation of circumstantial evidence.
To explore how the conscious avoidance doctrine may be
applied in the context of stolen cultural property, this Comment
presents three hypothetical situations. As we proceed through the
scenarios, keep in mind that red flags, or circumstantial evidence of
theft, “can be used to show both actual knowledge and conscious
avoidance.”74 In addition, as the charge under consideration is a
violation of the National Stolen Property Act, the reader should
assume that the government can prove that the subject of each
proposed transaction was, in fact, stolen and then moved across state
or international borders.
A. Scenario One: The Sale of Ancient Egyptian Artifacts
In this scenario, a seller offers a collection of hundreds of
Egyptian scarabs and shabtis to a buyer. A scarab is a small carved
stone or ceramic piece molded in the shape of a scarab beetle, an
insect that had religious and cultural significance to ancient
Egyptians.75 The flat bottoms of scarabs were generally engraved
so that they created a raised image when pressed into clay.76 A
shabti is a small figurine in the shape of a mummified person.77

United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Id. at 269–71.
74 United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260, 278 (2d Cir. 2011).
75 Kierra
Foley, Scarabs, JOHNS HOPKINS ARCHAEOLOGICAL MUSEUM,
http://archaeologicalmuseum.jhu.edu/the-collection/object-stories/ancient-egyptianamulets/scarabs/ [https://perma.cc/5RHW-MUZD].
76 Id.
77 Joshua J. Mark, Shabti Dolls: The Workforce in the Afterlife, ANCIENT HIST.
ENCYC. (Jan. 18, 2012), https://www.ancient.eu/article/119/shabti-dolls-the-workforce-in72
73
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Shabtis were buried with ancient Egyptians who believed that the
figures would become their servants in the afterlife.78 Shabtis were
commonly made of glazed or painted ceramic, but were also
fashioned from stone, wood, and other materials.79 Shabtis are
included in the ICOM Red List of Egyptian Cultural Objects at
Risk.80 Both artifacts—scarabs and shabtis—existed in large
numbers in ancient Egypt and continue to be found in modern
excavations. Egypt has a patrimony law recognized in U.S. courts,81
but many excavation sites have nonetheless been looted since it
went into effect, with evidence of looting dramatically increasing
beginning in 2009.82
Upon the buyer’s request, the seller provides a provenance
indicating that the collection was established before 1970, outside
of Egypt, by the current seller’s father and grandfather. No
documentation supporting this provenance is available besides the
seller’s statement. The artifacts have not been exhibited or
mentioned in any catalogs or publications. The seller’s price is on
the low end for the type of artifact on a per item basis, which the
seller explains is because the buyer is willing to purchase them in
bulk. The total purchase price has six digits.
In our example, there are two key facts that should cause a buyer
to be aware of a high probability that the artifacts are looted. First,
shabtis are listed in the ICOM Red List of Egyptian Cultural Objects
at Risk because they are among the “categories or types of
[Egyptian] cultural items that are most likely to be illegally bought
and sold.”83 Second, the sale involves a large group of small,
common items.84 Wary buyers may suspect that the offered

the-afterlife/ [https://perma.cc/84JY-QH6V].
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Emergency Red List of Egyptian Cultural Objects at Risk, INT’L COUNCIL OF
MUSEUMS,
https://icom.museum/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/120521_ERLE_ENPages.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PA7-3C73] [hereinafter ICOM Red List of Egyptian Cultural
Objects at Risk].
81 See, e.g., United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 402 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that
Egyptian Law 117 clearly and unambiguously vests ownership of antiquities found in
Egypt after 1983 in the Egyptian government and that Egypt actively enforced the law).
82 See Sarah Parcak, et al., Satellite Evidence of Archaeological Site Looting in
Egypt: 2002–2013, 90 ANTIQUITY 349, 193 (2016).
83 ICOM Red List of Egyptian Cultural Objects at Risk, supra note 80, at 2, 4.
84 See, e.g., Sarah Birnbaum, Hobby Lobby Ignored ‘Red Flags’ About Stolen Iraqi
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property is a hoard of artifacts found together far more recently than
1970.85 Arguably, the reference to “before 1970” in the provenance
is also a red flag as the date conveniently meets the 1970 standard
adopted by museum and archaeology professionals, despite the
seller offering no evidence supporting an acquisition by this date.86
Would the buyer recognize these issues or be aware of the recent
looting of Egyptian antiquities? The standard, after all, requires a
subjective belief or awareness.87 Perhaps the buyer is a novice,88
but then why is the buyer purchasing so many similar objects for
such a large sum of money? Why is the buyer interested in these
items? What investigation has he or she done that might have
informed the buyer of issues surrounding the illicit market in these
artifacts? Has the buyer consulted with an expert in cultural
property importation or in Egyptian artifacts in particular? What
advice did the buyer receive? These are the types of facts that a
factfinder would consider in determining whether the buyer was
aware of the high probability that the artifacts were looted.
If the buyer’s awareness of the potential looting is established,
the next step is to determine whether the buyer took steps to avoid
learning that the objects were, in fact, looted.89 We start by
considering what the buyer could have done in this scenario to
investigate the seller’s limited provenance. For example, the buyer
could have asked the seller to speak with other members of the
seller’s family about the family’s collecting history and ask if

Artifacts, PUB. RADIO INT’L (July 6, 2017, 2:15 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-0706/hobby-lobby-ignored-red-flags-about-stolen-iraqi-artifacts [https://perma.cc/YG7EHDUR] (“[A] massive scale — over 5,000 antiquities. ‘There’s no place for it to come
from in a legal way.’”).
85 See, e.g., id. (“[O]bjects that would have had to have left Iraq maybe 100 years
ago for them to be fully legal. And there are just so few of those. So, if somebody comes
up to you saying they have 3,000 Iraqi tablets to sell you and we didn’t know about them
beforehand, you should really expect that they’re loot.”).
86 See Guidelines on the Acquisition of Archaeological Material and Ancient Art,
supra note 59; see generally Gerstenblith, supra note 55, at 364 (discussing “the 1970
Standard”).
87 See United States v. Lumiere, 249 F. Supp. 3d 748, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
(discussing the element of subjective awareness).
88 See, e.g., United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 416 (2d Cir. 2003)
(acknowledging that experts in the field are held to a higher standard of knowledge).
89 See, e.g., United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 701 (9th Cir. 1976); O’MALLEY,
GRENIG, & LEE, supra note 36, § 17:09 (describing “deliberate ignorance”).
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anyone else recalled these objects.90 Perhaps the buyer could have
interrogated the seller on details of the collection—where had it
been stored, what precautions were taken to prevent breakage, and
who else has seen the pieces.91
B. Scenario Two: The Sale of a Painting by a Modern Artist
In this second scenario, we turn to a transaction involving
documented cultural property whose history may be easier to trace.
A buyer is considering the purchase of an oil-on-canvas painting by
an artist who sold her works in Europe in the years between World
Wars I and II through a gallery. The provenance lists only the
immediate prior owner who is identified as an anonymous Swiss
collector who acquired it on the Swiss art market in 1975. No prior
owners are mentioned. The price is consistent with similar works
by the artist. The painting is being offered by a well-regarded
London gallery.
A wary buyer should be concerned by the limited and vague
provenance provided for a modern piece. The natural concern,
based on the sale of a piece prior to World War II, is that the artwork
could have been stolen from or been the subject of a forced sale by
persons persecuted by the Nazi regime.92 If the buyer does not take

90 See, e.g., United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 264 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (“Belvedere had cause to suspect that Wally did not belong to the Rieger heirs
because when Garzarolli, Balke, Novotny, and Broda’s secretary inspected the works
restituted to the Rieger heirs to determine whether the Belvedere should acquire them, they
described Wally as ‘Portrait of a Woman,’ while handwritten notes indicate they knew it
depicted ‘Wally Neuzil from Vienna.’”).
91 See, e.g., Porter v. Wertz, 68 A.D.2d 141, 146 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (“Had Ms.
Drew-Bear done so much as call either of the telephone numbers Wertz had left, she would
have learned that Wertz was employed by a delicatessen and was not an art dealer.”);
Complaint at ¶ 25 and Statement of Facts at ¶ 6, United States v. Approx. 540 Ancient
Cuneiform Tablets, Docket no. 17-CV-3980 (LDH) (E.D.N.Y.) (despite the inclusion in
the provenance of two telephone numbers for a person in Mississippi who purportedly
stored the artifacts since the 1970s, Hobby Lobby did not attempt to contact the alleged
custodian to confirm this provenance, which was, in fact, false).
92 See Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 242 (The court held that even if Bondi
had sold Wally to Welz, it was a forced sale due to Nazi persecution). See generally Anne
Rothfeld, Nazi Looted Art: The Holocaust Records Preservation Project, 34 PROLOGUE 2
(Summer 2002) (providing additional information regarding Nazi Art Confiscations);
Soffia H. Kuehner Gray, The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016: An
Ineffective Remedy for Returning Nazi-Looted Art, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 368 (2019)
(“A provenance gap in a painting could indicate that it probably changed hands under the
Nazis or was even just stolen by the Nazi regime.”).
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steps to check the artwork against a registry that would include
Holocaust era items, a factfinder may well conclude that the buyer
deliberately closed his or her eyes to learning that the painting was
stolen.93 Efforts to authenticate paintings through catalogues
raisonnés or experts are also reasonable steps that can yield
provenance information.94 A failure to use these resources could be
deemed suspect.
Querying public databases such as the Interpol Stolen Works of
Art database95 or inquiring with databases such as the Art Loss
Register (“ALR”)96 or the Artive Database97 can tell a prospective
buyer if an object has been reported stolen. Visual searches for
suspected stolen Italian cultural property can be conducted using the
“iTPC” smartphone application provided by the Carabinieri
Command for the Protection of Cultural Heritage (known by its
Italian initials as the “TPC”).98 While these queries may be deemed

93 See Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 272 (finding that the seller knew that
Bondi owned Wally before prior to fleeing Nazi persecution and “never sought any sort of
documentary confirmation or attempted to contact the Rieger heirs or question Bondi
himself”).
94 See generally Provenance Guide, supra note 4 (An artist’s catalogue raisonné is a
“detailed compilation of an artist’s work and often includes some provenance information,
exhibition history, publication references, attributions, current owners, and identifying
features of the work, such as dimensions, inscriptions and condition.”).
95 Stolen Works of Art, INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/Crimes/Culturalheritage-crime/Stolen-Works-of-Art-Database [https://perma.cc/NXU8-WYL9] (The
Stolen Works of Art Database is an international database with descriptions and pictures
of more than 50,000 stolen works of art provided by authorized authorities. It is Interpol’s
main tool to combat the trafficking of cultural property).
96
The Art Loss Register, INT’L ART & ANTIQUE LOSS REG. LTD.,
https://www.artloss.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/W4JP-9ARB] (“The [Art Loss
Register] is the world’s largest private database of lost and stolen art, antiques, and
collectables.”).
97 ARTIVE, https://www.artive.org [https://perma.cc/ZS3M-E8KT] (The Artive
Database is used as a research platform to combat illicit activities by promoting due
diligence).
98 See Carabinieri for the Protection of Cultural Heritage and Anti-Counterfeiting,
MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, https://www.carabinieri.it/multilingua/en/english/carabinierifor-the-protection-of-cultural-heritage-and-anti-counterfeiting [https://perma.cc/U8JM2RYL] (The Comando Carabinieri per la Tutela del Patrimonio Culturale (Carabinieri
Command for the Protection of Cultural Heritage, in English) was created in 1969 to
combat looting); Andrew Lokay, Brigadier General Fabrizio Parrulli, Director of the
Carabinieri Art Squad, Speaks at the Smithsonian, ANTIQUITIES COALITION (Aug. 6, 2018),
https://theantiquitiescoalition.org/brigadier-general-parrulli-smithsonian/
[https://perma.cc/YZ6V-L2DM] (The iTPC smartphone application allows users to “input
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sufficient to support a good faith belief that a documented painting
or modern artwork was not stolen, a factfinder may not be persuaded
that the belief was actually held with respect to undocumented
artifacts. Artifacts that have been looted from the ground without
any record made of their discovery will not be listed in such
databases.99 At any rate, the conscious avoidance defense does not
depend on whether a belief is reasonably held, but whether a
factfinder concludes that, reasonable or not, it was actually held by
the defendant.100
C. Scenario Three: The Sale of an Ancient Roman Statue
In this scenario, a seller presents a provenance for an ancient
Roman statue that recounts that the statue has been held in an
anonymous private collection for the past 80 years. The statue is
not on display, but is crated at the time it is shown to the buyer. The
buyer notices that there is sandy soil on the bottom of the crate and
the statue’s feet are missing. Italy has a 1909 law governing
movable cultural property discovered pursuant to official
government excavations, and a 1939 law which provides for state
ownership of any discovered cultural property, regardless of how it
is discovered.101 These laws are actively enforced by the TPC.102
In this case, several facts should cause the buyer to be concerned
about the provenance. First, a piece that has been privately held for
80 years is expected to be clean with no dirt clinging to it that might

a photo of a work of art and search for a match in its database of stolen cultural property.”).
99 See Derek Fincham, Assessing the Viability of Blockchain to Impact the
Antiquities Trade, 37 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 605, 625 (2019) (noting the misuse of
ALR certificates by dealers and noting that “for antiquities, the [ALR] would not be
equipped to offer meaningful advice, as newly looted or forged antiquities would never be
able to be flagged by their database”).
100 See, e.g., United States v. Quinones, 635 F.3d 590, 602 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[T]he
belief held by the defendant need not be reasonable in order for it to defeat a conscious
avoidance theory of actual knowledge.”); United States v. Catano-Alzate, 62 F.3d 41, 43
(2d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he doctrine of conscious avoidance does not permit a finding of guilty
knowledge if the defendant actually did not believe that he or she was involved in the
transportation of drugs, however irrational that belief may have been.”).
101 Legge 1 giguno 1939, n.1089(43)–(49), G.U. Aug. 8, 1939, n.184 (It.); Legge 20
giguno 1909, n.364(15), G.U. June 28, 1909, n. 150 (It.).
102 See Carabinieri for the Protection of Cultural Heritage and Anti-Counterfeiting,
supra note 98 (containing websites describing TPC’s efforts, successes, and leadership in
combatting illicit cultural property trafficking in Italy and internationally).
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fall off in transit.103 A statue held this long is also more likely to
have been made public by its owner through exhibition or
publication. Second, a statue broken at a weak point such as the
ankles or neck could indicate that the piece was severed from a
larger piece; dissecting a statue is not the expected conduct of an
owner looking to preserve the value of his property.104 The buyer
should, therefore, look to see if the break near the ankles appears
new, or whether the statue was more likely broken in antiquity.105
In addition, the assertion of private ownership for “80 years” is
suspicious considering that at the time of the offer, the 1939
patrimony law was approximately 80 years old.
Depending on the overall facts of the case, a factfinder might
conclude that these red flags are enough to find that the buyer
actually knew the statue was stolen. Alternatively, the factfinder
may conclude that these facts are sufficient to cause the buyer to be
aware of a high probability that the statue was stolen. If the buyer
deliberately makes no further inquiry to determine the legality of
the sale, knowledge of the illegality may be established via
conscious avoidance.
V. Conclusion
As the Schultz and Portrait of Wally cases show, the conscious
avoidance doctrine applies to transactions involving cultural
property that violate the National Stolen Property Act. While these

103 See, e.g., Georgi Kantchev, Buyer Beware: Looted Antiquities Flood Online Sites
Like Amazon and Facebook, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1, 2017, 4:46 AM)
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-online-bazaar-for-looted-antiquities1509466087?mod=e2fb [https://perma.cc/HKM2-K26Q] (Coins being sold online as
“uncleaned coins,” or with what experts refer to such coins as having “desert patina,” a
mineral deposit similar to rust that often adheres to metal objects as they decay, is a
“telltale sign they might have been recently excavated”).
104 See, e.g., Tom Mueller, How Tomb Raiders Are Stealing Our History, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC
(June
2016),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2016/06/looting-ancient-bloodantiquities/#close [perma.cc/VU9B-SVR4] (In the Khouli case, an Egyptian sarcophagus
was found in New York with “fresh cuts across [it’s] upper thighs” where looters had made
a transverse cut across the sarcophagus so that it could be transported to the United States
in four pieces.); Complaint, United States v. A 10th Century Cambodian Sandstone
Sculpture, No. 12 Civ. 2600, 2012 WL 1120480 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2012) (seeking
forfeiture of a 10th century Khmer statue which had been “broken off at the ankles” from
its pedestal outside a temple in Cambodia).
105 See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 104 (fresh cuts on a wooden sarcophagus).
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cases involved buyers with some direct knowledge of wrongdoing,
the doctrine can be equally applied where the knowledge of a
downstream buyer is placed in issue. As discussed in this
Comment, buyers faced with red flags who choose not to investigate
them cannot rely on deliberate ignorance as a defense to a charge
that they knowingly transacted in or possessed stolen cultural
property. To the contrary, if the government proves that a buyer
intentionally looked the other way when purchasing stolen cultural
property, a factfinder can conclude that the buyer knowingly
violated the NSPA. In addition, courts may look unfavorably on
buyers whose past experience has caused them to become familiar
with the legal issues and red flags surrounding the cultural property
that is the subject of the transaction.
The collectors quoted at the beginning of this Comment
expressed a willingness to assume risk during the purchase of
cultural property. To date, such collectors have considered their risk
to be financial: the loss of the antiquities’ value, the possibility of
being sued by a theft victim or of the objects being seized and
forfeited by law enforcement, and any legal fees expended in
defending such litigation. However, it is time for participants in the
cultural property market to recognize a more significant risk—
criminal liability for dealing in or possessing stolen property. The
penalty for violating the NSPA is a felony conviction punishable by
up to ten years in prison.106 The risk of criminal liability, including
incarceration and the collateral consequences of having a felony
conviction, rather than potential loss of portfolio value, should be
the foremost risk on the minds of cultural property purchasers.

106

National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–2315 (2012).

